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POLICING IN PARTNERSHIP: NICARAGUAN POLICIES
WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICE FORCES
INTRODUCTION
In the face of surging regional violence, processes and techniques developed
by the Nicaraguan National Police yield the lowest violent crime rates in the
region, in spite of ranking as the poorest country in Central America.1 Bucking
the trend towards militarization in regional police forces, mirroring U.S. policy,2
Nicaragua has developed community-centered programs that emphasize
restorative justice.3 In this endeavor, Nicaragua is harnessing the intent behind
the traditionally backward-looking goals of transitional justice mechanisms4 and
deploying these tenets towards a proactive state-security model.5 This concept
is codified in legislation aimed at prioritizing citizen security through programs
emphasizing constant reform of security apparatuses in partnership with the
population.6 Nicaragua’s community-policing techniques, informed by the
vernacular of transitional justice, are intended to prevent the reoccurrence of

1
Santiago Ramirez, Inter-American Development Bank [IDB], Violence and Crime in Nicaragua: A
Country Profile, Discussion Paper, No. IDB-DP-306, 34 (June 2013) (measuring GDP per capita; in terms of
real GDP Nicaragua ranks second poorest behind Belize).
2
This phenomenon has been described as the “(re)production of US-American state sovereignty through
‘de-territorialized campaigns of public safety’ that are ‘focused on countering territorial contamination and
transgression—‘terrorist’, demographic and biological infiltration.’” Markus-Michael Müller, Punitive
Entanglements: The War on Gangs and the Making of a Transnational Penal Apparatus in the Americas, 20
GEOPOLITICS 696, 697 (2015).
3
Yader Prado Reyes, Primera Comisionada Aminta Granera: En Nicaragua el Pueblo es Protagonista
de su Propia Seguridad, EL 19 (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:46168-primeracomisionada-aminta-granera-en-nicaragua-el-pueblo-es-protagonista-de-su-propia-seguridad.
4
These programs are targeted at preventing the “recurrence of crises and future violations of human
rights, to ensure social cohesion, nation-building, ownership and inclusiveness at the national and local levels
and to promote reconciliation.” Pablo de Greiff, Annual Rep. on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation,
and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/46 (Aug. 9, 2012); see Ruti G. Teitel,
Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893 (2002) (describing the backward looking nature
of traditional transitional justice). Here, Nicaragua has applied the tenets of non-recurrence through constant
reform aimed at ownership and inclusiveness in the community through partnerships at the policing level. See
Ley No. 872, 26 June 2014, Ley de Organización, Funciones, Carrera y Régimen Especial de Seguridad Social
de la Policía Nacional, [Ley de Bienestar y Seguridad Social] [Wellbeing and Social Security Law] tit. I., ch. II.,
Art. VII, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 7 July 2014 (Nicar.) [hereinafter Ley No. 872].
5
See Ley No. 872, supra note 4.
6
See id.
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violence by addressing root causes7 rather than reacting to them and perpetuating
cycles of violence.8
Nicaragua’s experiences have not comported with its neighbors, both
regionally and globally. In explaining incongruous crime statistics, the Director
of Nicaragua’s National Police, Aminta Granera, emphasized that her
department’s greatest strength rests in its commitment to community
involvement.9 This concept of community involvement is not a uniquely
Nicaraguan development. The 1990s saw the rise of community policing in the
United States before gang violence pivoted policy towards the militarization of
these police forces, a technique then copied by many of Nicaragua’s neighbors.10
In many ways, Nicaragua’s policies build on the intellectual antecedents of
American community policing, presenting a new modern form, worthy of
transfer, that U.S. forces should consider tailoring to their own communities.
Through an examination of Nicaragua’s community-focused processes and
techniques, exportable and best practices will be distilled. In order to extract
uniquely Nicaraguan methods, neighbors’ approaches will be compared,
highlighting different strategies while distinguishing alternative factors that
have been proposed as drivers of violence or peace. Once Nicaraguan practices
have been differentiated from the region, they will be contrasted with those in
place in U.S. jurisdictions (as it relates to national trends given the lack of a
national police force). Specific emphasis will center on the prevention of, and
not the reaction to, crime through cooperation with stakeholders, including but
not limited to: community members, victims, perpetrators, and the criminal
justice system with a focus on law enforcement.
While there are manifold factors contributing to violence in the region, this
inquiry will focus exclusively on youth gang violence and the processes by
which Nicaragua confronts this challenge. This study will not delve into the

7
Mark Ungar & Enrique Desmond Arias, Reassessing Community-Oriented Policing in Latin America,
22 POLICING SOC’Y 1, 2 (2012).
8
This reactionary response to gang violence, as one author suggests, has led to “more powerful and
brutal” gangs as “all-out war” has led to continued violence at unprecedented levels. José Miguel Cruz, Criminal
Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State, 53 LATIN AM. POL. &
SOC’Y 1, 26 (2011).
9
Hannah Stone, Exporting Nicaragua’s Security Model, INSIGHT CRIME (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.
insightcrime.org/news-analysis/exporting-nicaraguas-security-model (summarizing her model as one that is
“preventative, proactive, communitarian, deeply rooted in the heart of the community.”).
10
See generally Luis E. Preciado, State Approaches Toward Reducing Youth Violence in Honduras and
Nicaragua, 3 (2015) (Masters Thesis Naval Postgraduate School).
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political process other than that which cannot be divorced from police practice.11
While interdisciplinary scholarship has focused on economics and policies
underlying narco-trafficking, this Comment will be constrained to the violence
executed by youth gangs and governmental responses. There will be a further
emphasis on the frontline community level to address this violence and the
ensuing effect on its prevalence and subsequent rehabilitation and incarceration
of individuals involved in its perpetuation. Finally, an emerging topic
specifically in Nicaragua has been gender-based violence; this category of
violence is admittedly broad and will not be subjected to a cursory mention when
it is deserving of its own scholarship. This Comment will not delve into political
power structures except when necessary to frame youth gang violence within the
context of its historical and geopolitical reality.
Part I of this Comment will frame the development of Nicaragua’s policies,
guided by the overarching aims of transitional justice and shaped by the role of
youth gang violence. Gangs and their composition will be surveyed to
understand the impetus behind responses and ensuing outcomes of programs in
Central America. Against this backdrop, U.S. gang prevalence and responses
will be surveyed, setting up a foil to the Nicaraguan approach that will be
subsequently unpacked. Part II will analyze Nicaragua’s specific initiatives,
exposing best practices that operate independently of historical influences and
can be distinguished from its neighbors and thus exported. This template,
predicated on public legitimacy gained through community involvement,
education, and rehabilitation, will then be extrapolated beyond countries
transitioning from violence to democracy, specifically U.S. police forces. This
process will highlight the critical nature of the police-community interaction as
the “first link in the criminal justice system.”12 While definitions of communityoriented policing vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, consensus may
exist at a “fundamental level” once “factors contributing to the divergence of
definition” have been addressed.13 This entire process will be driven by context,
as mimetic approaches have exposed the pitfalls of broadly applied yet

11
Political structure will have to be discussed in the context of Nicaragua and her neighbors to analyze
the claim that “references to maras and migration have obscured explanations” of violence in the region and the
disparate levels of violence can be explained by State contributions to violence which is evidenced by their
“tolerating, encouraging, and even participating in the production of criminal violence.” Cruz, supra note 8, at
25−26.
12
Crime in Latin America: A Broken System, THE ECONOMIST (July 12, 2014), http://www.economist.
com/news/americas/21606864-citizens-security-regions-biggest-problem-time-improve-criminal-justicebroken. [hereinafter Crime in Latin America].
13
SUMEDH RAO, GSDRC HELPDESK RESEARCH REPORT: COMMUNITY POLICING IN FRAGILE AND
CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES 3 (2013), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq997.pdf.
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untailored solutions.14 The conclusion section will promote Nicaraguan
components embodied by four factors: (1) political commitment to reform, (2)
community involvement, (3) restorative justice through education and
rehabilitation, and (4) public legitimacy. These factors can then be tailored to
the U.S. system resulting in a modern definition of community policing
informed by Nicaragua’s transitional justice experience.
I.

BACKGROUND

The field of transitional justice provides a framework informing the
transition from violence to democracy.15 Once truth, justice, and reparations
have been addressed, the end goal is institutional reform ensuring nonrecurrence;16 however, existing police culture and strained community relations
have become roadblocks impeding progress before, after, and during these
transitions.17 This blurring of the boundary between periods of transition and
normalcy has created tension between traditional transitional justice frameworks
and steady-state transition.18 This contradiction predicated on the time horizons
of transition makes local context critical in shaping the outcome and legitimacy
of the rule of law.19 Nowhere is this paradigm more evident than in Latin
America, specifically Central America, where a “pervasive weakness in the
basic institutions of the rule of law” has engendered a marked lack of faith in the
criminal justice system.20
This lack of faith in the criminal justice system is warranted, as worldwide
homicide conviction rates stand at forty-three out of every one hundred murders,
whereas in Latin America less than half, roughly twenty out of every one

14
CHARLES M. KATZ & VINCENT J. WEBB, POLICE RESPONSE TO GANGS: A MULTI-SITE STUDY 321
(2004), https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/solution_gang_crime/pubs/PoliceResponsetoGangs.pdf.
15
Ruti Teitel, who coined the term, defines transitional justice as the “conception of justice associated
with periods of political change.” Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69
(2003).
16
Intuitively, to guarantee non-recurrence, constant and responsive reforms would be required to
encompass a “holistic” approach. de Greiff, supra note 4, ¶ 20.
17
RAO, supra note 13 (explaining that “there have been some benefits, though the programmes have not
been as transformative as hoped” in conflict-affected states, stemming from police culture and community
relations).
18
Teitel, supra note 15, at 93; see also Teitel, supra note 4, at 896 (describing this shift as one that is
moving away from “judgment” and is being “associated with the more complex and diversely felt necessities of
State-building in contemporary political circumstances”).
19
Teitel, supra note 15, at 93.
20
Crime in Latin America, supra note 12 (Examining this breakdown, it is imperative to view transitional
justice mechanisms through the lens of “the characteristics of the contexts in which they are applied” given the
reality that they must be “fine-tuned, targeted and sensitive to context.”); de Greiff supra note 4, ¶ 18.
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hundred, are convicted.21 While the core processes of transitional justice seek
justice, reparation, truth, and reform, steady-state transition applies these
concepts to instances of “pervasive conflict.”22 Central American nations may
not be in the midst of traditional transitional periods; however, institutional
breakdowns illustrated by gang violence should be addressed within this broader
concept of “steady-[s]tate” transitional justice.23 This “expanded humanitarian
discourse” that emerges as a result of the politics of globalization is driven by
instability begotten by violence.24 As a result, Nicaraguan approaches can be
seen through the lens of two of the transitional justice processes: constant reform
targeted at justice in the midst of violence.25
This systemic breakdown, fueled by violence, has resulted in “internal
displacement” and “record-level emigration of unaccompanied alien children
(UAC) and families to the United States.”26 It is this context of violence and
diaspora that led the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to declare that
violence, specifically gang violence, has created a “refugee-like” situation.27
While the specter of traditional war may have yielded to a democratically elected
government, institutional development continues to indicate that this transitional
period may not be over, as factors including the “absence of violence,” tracked
by the Inter-American Development Bank, suggest that Central American
countries continue to confront systemic problems.28
As a result, analysis of police-community relations and police culture
through the lens of transitional justice,29 couched in the discourse of human

21

Crime in Latin America, supra note 12.
de Greiff, supra note 4, ¶ 10. The UN Special Rapporteur defines this set of processes as “preventing
the recurrence of crises and future violations of human rights, to ensure social cohesion, nation-building,
ownership and inclusiveness at the national and local levels and to promote reconciliation.” Id. ¶ 46; see Teitel,
supra note 15, at 71−72, 78, 89−90 (describing the post-Cold War transitions as being associated with “diverse
Nation-building projects” and describing present conditions of ongoing conflict).
23
Teitel, supra note 15, at 89−90.
24
Id. at 90.
25
See de Greiff, supra note 4, ¶ 46.
26
CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34112, GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 1 (2016).
27
Id.
28
Ramirez, supra note 1, at 34.
29
de Greiff, supra note 4, ¶ 46 (examining the community policing initiatives through the lens of the
goals of transitional justice, set out as justice, reparation, truth, and reform (in order to prevent re-occurrence)).
22
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rights law,30 provides a pathway for achieving stability and peace.31 Transitional
justice has been characterized as “backward-looking” in its application to prior
conflicts,32 but the community policing principles developed by Nicaragua in
the crucible of steady-state transition provides a template to escape this cycle of
historical “concepts of justice” through a State-Security model.33 This StateSecurity model is predicated on the transitional justice tenet of non-recurrence
achieved through proactive community engagement by the police force at a local
level.34 Through its employment of this approach, Nicaragua has emerged as an
outlier in terms of its crime statistics, which result from policing practices guided
by both its internal culture and community outreach.35 While developed in an
evolving transitional period, this methodology should be considered in other
applications given local gang and community contexts that extend beyond the
traditional “transitional” period.
A. The Rise of Youth Gangs
In Central America, youth gangs,36 like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and
Barrio 18, are instigators of systemic violence.37 Disagreement exists as to the
scope of violence attributable to these gangs, with regional estimates ranging
30
For example, it has been argued that rather than criminalize certain acts coupled with forceful
responses, institutions would be better served by hewing to U.N. Rights of the Child Convention. JOSÉ LUIS
ROCHA & DENNIS RODGERS, GANGS OF NICARAGUA 162 (IMPRESIONES HELIOS 1st ed. 2008). In fact, the Mano
Dura approach in El Salvador was struck down for its violation of the Convention. RODGERS ET AL., GANGS OF
CENTRAL AMERICA: CASES, COSTS, AND INTERVENTIONS (2009), reprinted in SMALL ARMS SURVEY;
OCCASIONAL PAPER 23, 12.
31
Ramirez, supra note 1, at 34 (the six World Governance Indicators are “political stability/absence of
violence, control of corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, government effectiveness, and voice and
accountability”); see also Rao, supra note 13, at 2 (drawing from case studies in Afghanistan, Kenya, and Sierra
Leone, the author has found that through these relationships, state legitimacy was strengthened along with trust
while exposing a series of lessons that are indicative of the challenges which will be highlighted throughout
Central America).
32
Teitel, supra note 4, at 905 (describing this “backwards-looking” approach as one that is “not capable
of ensuring prospective security”).
33
It has been argued that transitional justice principles are not “adequate” in guiding situations
“addressing the move to politics,” but a post-conflict conception of these principles can provide “needed
authority” guiding “situations of heightened political fragmentation.” Id.
34
Stone, supra note 9.
35
Crime in Latin America, supra note 12.
36
Youth gangs are defined by members ranging between twelve and twenty-four years of age. Seelke,
supra note 26, at 1–2.
37
Id. at 5–7. “Youth gangs” is the most encompassing term as there is no “universally accepted
definition” of what constitutes a “gang” amongst law enforcement agencies; therefore, in surveys, agencies are
asked to identify “a group of youths or young adults in your jurisdiction that you or other responsible persons in
your agency or community are willing to identify as a ‘gang.’” Also “youth” is not synonymous with “juvenile.”
National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, NAT’L GANG CTR., https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/SurveyAnalysis (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
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from 10%-60%.38 Further clouding these numbers is the fact that not all gangs
are cataloged equally, leading to two distinct classifications in Central America:
pandillas and maras.39 Grasping the nuanced distinction between these two
classifications is critical, as the dichotomy has resulted in disparate
governmental responses driven by societal perceptions.40
Gang culture in Central American society has entrenched itself as a
“persistent social phenomenon” constantly evolving from its inception in the
urban modernization of the 1940s.41 The emergence of modern gangs in the
region can be traced to the end of the conflicts of the 1990s when former
guerillas found themselves “facing situations of heightened uncertainty,
insecurity, and socio-economic flux” upon returning to civilian life.42 These
former freedom fighters, lacking a clear direction or sense of purpose, founded
gangs whose structure channeled “traditional organizational vehicle[s] for
collective youth action.”43 Pandillas represent the historical notion of gangs in
Central America composed of “localized groups that have long been present in
the region,” while maras are derived from transnational roots.44
When interviewing members of pandillas across national lines, a single word
was used to describe their individual organizations: family.45 This
characterization is unsurprising given their roots in collective youth action,
which morphed into “local vigilante style self-defense groups.”46 While it would
be easy to write pandillas off as remnants of regional conflicts, this would be
neglecting the reality that pandillas are byproducts of the society in which they
exist, evolving along with their communities and experiences.47 This community
dynamic cannot be stressed enough, as it undergirds the Nicaraguan response.
While still drawing from pandilla culture, the maras combine influences that

38

RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 1.
Seelke, supra note 26, at 3.
40
The Mano Dura approach rose to prominence as a response to the mara ascendency, while Nicaragua’s
community-oriented approach is lauded for the very reason that it has excluded mara gangs from its borders.
Reyes, supra note 3.
41
Dennis Rodgers, Nicaragua’s Gangs: Historical Legacy or Contemporary Symptom?, N. AM. CONG.
LATIN
AM.,
https://nacla.org/article/nicaragua%25E2%2580%2599s-gangs-historical-legacy-orON
contemporary-symptom (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
42
RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 6.
43
Id.
44
Seelke, supra note 26.
45
JOSÉ ALBERTO RODRÍGUEZ BOLAÑOS & JORGE SANABRIA LEÓN, DEMOSCOPÍA S.A., MARAS Y
PANDILLAS, COMUNIDAD Y POLÍCIA EN CENTROAMÉRICA 14 (2007).
46
Rodgers, supra note 41, at 2.
47
Id.
39
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span local communities and shared societal experiences, leading to their
disparate treatment.48
While the origin of the term mara is one that has emerged as a result of
convoluted and sometimes inconsistent designations, its source can be traced to
El Salvador.49 Maras brought their violence and culture home with them upon
their return from abroad rather than forming organically following domestic
conflict.50 This transnational component has been mapped to the expulsion of
200,000 individuals who were deported from the United States between 1998
and 2005, roughly a quarter of whom were convicted criminals.51 Among this
criminal contingent of deportees were members of the 18th Street Gang, which
was founded by Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles, that expanded rapidly by
recruiting Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees.52 The 18th Street gang
recruited members to fight turf wars with its rival (and also potentially a spinoff) gang, MS-13.53 As deportees arrived home, their Americanized gang culture
did not supplant local pandilla culture. Rather, their culture incorporated aspects
of both traditions, creating the maras, which are now pervasive in the Northern
Triangle countries (composed of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador).54 This
transnational component has resulted in the importation of transnational policing
techniques specifically “inspired—in ideational as well as in practical terms —
by New York City-style zero-tolerance policing.”55 In the eyes of a “growing
number of observers,” maras have transcended the scope of traditional gangs
and are seen as a “new urban insurgency.”56 Given this classification, it is not
surprising that the term “war,” rather than policing, describes state responses to
maras.57 In spite of this transnational or globalized influence, it has been argued

48
49

Id. at 4 (terming their origins as stemming from a “unique transnational development”).
Anika Oettler, The Central American Fear of Youth, 5 (2) INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE, 261, 266

(2011).
50
Rodgers, supra note 41, at 2–3. (It is worth noting that, while Northern Triangle refugees gravitated to
the West Coast where MS-13 and 18th Street [Barrio 18] were born, Nicaraguan immigrants were concentrated
in Costa Rica and Miami, which did not suffer from the same gang dynamic). Stone, supra note 9.
51
Rodgers, supra note 41, at 2. Following the 1996 passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, 46,000 convicts were deported for any conviction resulting in a sentence of one
year or more. RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
52
RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
53
Id. (explaining the origin of the word “MS” [Mara Salvatrucha] as a “combination of salvadoreńo and
trucha, meaning ‘quick thinking’ or ‘shrewd’ in Salvadoran slang”).
54
Rodgers, supra note 41.
55
Müller, supra note 2, at 709.
56
Id. at 697.
57
Id. at 696.
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that pandillas are actually more representative, globally speaking, of “youth
gangsterism” than the maras.58
Focusing on Central America, the State Department has estimated that mara
membership in the Northern Triangle numbers as high as 85,000,59 while the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has placed that same
regional number at close to 500,000.60 As a result of this data, within the context
of violence and diaspora, Central American nations have implemented programs
to combat both violence and immigration trends, targeting the youth gangs seen
as a root cause of this “refugee-like” crisis.61 These programs have received
heightened scrutiny following the passage of a Central America border control
agreement, enabling the visa-less passage between citizens of Northern Triangle
countries and their neighbor to the south, Nicaragua.62 It was feared that
unrestricted flow of individuals would inevitably allow for the movement of
gang members and the accompanying exportation of violence and displacement
that had become endemic in the Northern Triangle.63 To date, Nicaragua remains
mara free.64
Meanwhile, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have seen spiking
homicide rates that have oscillated between twenty-four and eighty homicides
per 100,000 inhabitants over the last decade, with El Salvador’s surging past one
hundred homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015.65 While academics dispute
the percentage shares of violence attributable to gangs,66 government responses
have not suffered from such equivocation.67 These Central American countries
have adopted some form of reactionary measures in response to what is seen as
58
Rodgers, supra note 41, at 4 (This distinction potentially makes lessons learned from pandilla
engagement [i.e. Nicaragua] more widely applicable outside of the region).
59
Silva Mathema, They are Refugees: An Increasing Number of People are Fleeing Violence in the
Northern Triangle, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
immigration/news/2016/02/24/131645/they-are-refugees-an-increasing-number-of-people-are-fleeingviolence-in-the-northern-triangle/.
60
RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 4.
61
Seelke, supra note 26.
62
Stone, supra note 9.
63
Id.
64
Reyes, supra note 3.
65
Seelke, supra note 26, at 6; see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at 15 (charting homicide rates in Central
America between 1996 and 2012); see generally Orlando J. Pérez, Gang Violence and Insecurity in
Contemporary Central America, BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH 32, 217–34 (2013) (Homicide rates
are the most reliable indicator of violence given that homicides rarely go unreported).
66
RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 1; see also Cruz, supra note 8, at 25 (positing that maras are merely
“scapegoats for insecurity and justified draconian state responses,” shifting the burden of violence from gangs
to state actors).
67
ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 179.

RATCHFORD GALLEY_PROOFS2

182

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

12/1/2017 10:27 AM

[Vol. 32

a “destabilizing menace, more immediate than any conventional or guerilla
war.”68 However, their efforts have not yielded Nicaragua’s results.69 Further,
Northern Triangle policies mirror U.S. techniques, presenting a regional
analogue that enables comparison of policies within the region for analysis
outside of its borders.70
Gang violence is not purely a Central American problem; between 2009 and
2012, gangs in the United States added 400,000 members to their roles, an
increase of forty percent.71 This statistic is of particular importance given that
these gangs are responsible for an average of forty-eight percent of violent crime
and up to ninety percent in some jurisdictions.72 Further, MS-13 and the 18th
Street Gang are expanding faster than other national gangs, and, given their
“transnational” component, U.S. responses have focused not only at home but
also abroad.73 The Mérida Initiative, “the largest multi-year U.S. foreign aid and
security package,” prioritized the gang problem by naming it one of its four
pillars.74 Critics have described this approach as constituting the “[re]production
of US-American state sovereignty . . . ‘focused on countering territorial
contamination and transgression;’” however, examining statistics both at home
and abroad demonstrates that this approach is not producing the intended results
and space exists for an alternative approach.75
B. U.S. Police Culture in Context of Gang Violence
In the United States, the concept of community-oriented policing rose to
prominence in the 1990s and was characterized by the development of a close
working relationship between community members and police officers.76 This
response was one of several stimulated by 200 distinct recommendations in a
report compiled by commissioners selected by President Johnson, who were
68

Id. This characterization emerged during a regional summit of heads of Central American states. Id. at

180.
69
RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 4 (“These qualitative studies also highlight the fact that there is great
diversity among countries in the region. At this writing, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are clearly
experiencing much greater levels of gang violence than Costa Rica and Nicaragua.”).
70
See generally Müller, supra note 2, at 709–10.
71
2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011national-gang-threat-assessment (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
72
Id.
73
Müller, supra note 2, at 715.
74
Id.
75
Id. Violence statistics in countries containing maras have in fact risen significantly since 2007. See
Seelke, supra note 26, at 1, 14; 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, supra note 71.
76
Ungar & Arias, supra note 7 (discussing the origins of community-oriented policing as it was exported
to Latin America).
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charged with investigating the state of Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice in America.77 Community-oriented policing was, in part, a legacy of
problem-oriented policing (POP), a direct result of the commission’s report that
shaped a new organizational structure termed the Professional Model.78 Acting
within the constraints of this professionalization, community-oriented policing
emphasized patrolling and interacting with the community in order to
proactively police these communities, as opposed to focusing on reacting to
crimes after they had occurred.79 Community policing identified that it was the
general fear of being bothered by disorderly actors that enabled police visibility
to elevate the perceived level of public order.80 However, these interactions with
and within the community will only function with community buy-in; otherwise,
patrols simply produce presence, not results.81 The community must perceive
the intent of police behavior as being driven by a sense of community
cooperation to address jointly identified problems and not by the threat of
punishment.82 While these concepts were being introduced in police forces
across the United States, extrinsic factors led to legislation that shifted police
strategies in order to deal with new realities.
California, in response to the nationally televised Rodney King riots, led the
way in 1992 with the implementation of strict measures meant to crack down on
gang violence.83 A signature provision in this legislation granted prosecutors the
ability to charge minors as adults, resulting in prison terms for hundreds of

77

Nicholas de Katzenbach et al., Foreword to THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967)
(intending to understand more “about those who commit, about those who are its victims, and about what can
be done to reduce it” to create a “safer and more just society”).
78
The Professional Model was characterized by updating departments and reorganizing them according
to a rigid hierarchical structure which was characterized by three tactics: “(1) Motorized patrol, (2) rapid
response to calls for service, and (3) retrospective investigation of crimes.” Mark Moore, Robert Trojanowicz &
George Kelling, Crime and Policing, NAT’L INST. JUST. (1988).
79
Ungar & Arias, supra note 7. Problem-oriented policing on the other hand simply sought feedback
from citizens in order to “help them identify and solve problems in their own communities,” a backward-looking
approach that was confronted by community policing. Moore, Trojanowicz & Kelling supra note 78, at 3.
80
James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows; The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29, 32 (1982) (Interestingly, in 1982, data did not support the concept of communityoriented policing as an effective way of cutting street crime as harm was not equated with fear but rather
disorder).
81
Tom Tyler, The Paradox of American Policing: Performance without Legitimacy, DISPATCH, July
2010, http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/July_2010/AmericanPolicing.asp.
82
This legitimacy can only be developed when it is the “fairness of police behavior–not the fear of police
force and the threat of punishment–[that] creates legitimacy, and through it drives public actions.” Id.
83
These riots “heavily involved” both the 18th Street Gang and the Mara Salavatrucha and were part of
the impetus behind the passing of these toughened laws. RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
BY THE
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underage members of mara gangs.84 This cohort would form part of the nearly
200,000 individuals who were deported as a result of the congressional passage
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.85
The implementation of this legislation prompted an analogous national trend in
police culture.
A corresponding movement towards the militarization of police forces,
paralleling these stricter laws, became a key component of zero-tolerance
policing.86 In order to enforce this type of mandate, there was a greater emphasis
on—or in some cases, the creation of—police paramilitary units (PPUs) and
SWAT teams.87 Police forces that had been associated with a community
policing model implemented these militarized components that were
irreconcilable with a community-oriented approach.88 This disconnect was
further reinforced within these departments by creating specialized gang units
whose focus was reactionary, eschewing traditional community- and problemoriented policing practices.89 The centralized gang unit response, as it currently
functions, is incompatible with community policing given its emphasis on
decentralization and lack of community involvement.90 Based on multi-site
studies, when gang officers do partner with the community, their singular goal
is to access information, not the “co-production of public safety.”91 This
contradiction, created by gang units within departments committed to
community policing, can only be understood in the context of abstract and
inclusive definitions extended to modern community-oriented policing.92 Given
this ambiguity and these divergent concepts across jurisdictions,93 a space exists
both abroad and at home to determine the essential nature of these various

84

Id.
Id. at 6. This was the same group that would form the transnational component of the mara gangs in
the Northern Triangle. Rodgers, supra note 41, at 2.
86
MATTHEW T. DEMICHELE & PETER B. KRASKA, Community Policing in Battle Garb, in MILITARIZING
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE 82,
88–89 (Peter B. Kraska ed., UPNE 2001).
87
Id. at 83.
88
Id. at 88–89.
89
KATZ & WEBB, supra note 14, at 321. Anecdotally, a precinct lieutenant described his gang unit’s use
of community policing as follows: “[Y]es, from a standpoint that there is liaison and they are dealing with the
internal customers, mainly patrol officers, yes. No, from the standpoint that they are not solving problems long
term, they are solving them short term . . . the short-term reactionary issues.” Id. at 424.
90
Id. at 396.
91
Id. at 475.
92
For example, broad-ranging definitions of community-oriented policing models have described
portions of the Professional Model, the “broken windows” approach, and even a “governmentality” approach.
See generally DEMICHELE & KRASKA, supra note 86.
93
See generally id.
85
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programs as they are informed by the goals of transitional justice exemplified
by Nicaragua’s approach.
C. Regional Responses to Gang Violence
One of the more prevalent approaches in Central America employs “mano
dura” (directly translated as “heavy hand”), which has become the catch-all term
for militarized approaches aimed at addressing the surging violence in the
region.94 These approaches are intended to deter “anti-social behaviors” in
specific neighborhoods through the use of what can only be called “aggressive
tactics.”95 These approaches track the U.S. concept of zero-tolerance policing
and provide a counterpoint to the Nicaraguan model, notwithstanding that their
histories reflect many of the same transitional antecedents Nicaragua
experienced.96
In El Salvador, where there were nine murders per day by 2014,97 these
strategies resulted in 2,438 arrests just for having signature gang tattoos and
wearing particular clothing styles.98 This crackdown stemmed from the
criminalization of petty crimes and social disobedience, signaling the
commitment of El Salvador to purging themselves of the maras.99 The
seriousness of the government’s intent was reinforced by the operations’
assignment to military units rather than the police force.100 Further cementing its
commitment to militarization, El Salvador introduced Operation New Dawn in
2009, officially assigning forty percent of its military force to public security
matters.101 This delegation of traditional police operations to the military was
not unique to El Salvador. Guatemala codified the role of their military in police

94
Preciado, supra note 10; see also José Miguel Cruz, The Root Causes of the Central American Crisis,
114 CURRENT HISTORY, Feb. 2015, at 43, 47 [hereinafter “The Root Causes”]. Other program names demonstrate
the same commitment to repression as evidenced by “the Broom Plan, the Zero Tolerance Plan, the Hard Hand
Plan and the Super Hard Hand Plan.” ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 162.
95
Oettler, supra note 49, at 273; see Müller supra note 2, at 712 (describing the analogous “tough on
crime approach” imported from the United States).
96
DEMICHELE & KRASKA, supra note 86, at 84; see, e.g., Müller, supra note 2, at 705, 709 (describing
civil gang injunctions in the U.S. which closely track the “anti-social behaviors” targeted by Northern Triangle
governments).
97
Seelke, supra note 26.
98
Oettler, supra note 49, at 261. These arrests were short lived as the original mano dura plan was struck
down in El Salvador for violating UN Rights of the Child conventions. ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30.
99
Preciado, supra note 10, at 3–4.
100
Id.
101
Matt Budd, Countering Militarised Public Security in Latin America: Lessons from Nicaragua,
SUSTAINABLE SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2013), https://sustainablesecurity.org/2013/11/12/community-policing-innicaragua/.
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action through the Protocol for Inter-institutional Action.102 Honduras
emphasized this entwinement of their military and police forces in the public
security domain by vesting police authority in the Ministry of Defense,
establishing the Military Police of Public Order.103 Nicaragua, on the other hand,
implemented a different community-centered approach.
D. Nicaragua’s Approach To Gang Violence: In Context of National Police
In order to understand the distinct police culture and the relationship with
the community, it is imperative to place the analysis of Nicaraguan programs in
the context of its history.104 This history, like that of its neighbors, is riddled
with transitions between governments facilitated by violence, yet did not result
in the implementation of mano dura methods. Following nearly two decades of
civil war, a peace agreement was negotiated in 1990 between the Sandinistas
and the Contras.105 Armed gangs emerged from the ranks of both sides following
the ceasefire.106
These pandillas formed a natural extension for returning soldiers as it
provided the opportunity to continue “serving and protecting friends, families,
and local communities in a post-war context marked by heightened political
polarization and spiraling insecurity.”107 Pandillas traced their roots to this
context of security and neighborhood order.108 The first part of the 2000s,
however, shifted their focus from providing security and order to illicit dealings
that traded on the cachet of threats and violence.109 This development can be
understood through the broader lens of Nicaragua’s transformation to a
neoliberal economic model in which a cohort of young Nicaraguans lacking
education or trade skills found themselves unemployed, as sectors that
traditionally had required labor-intensive work were modernized.110 While the
102
Id. In this capacity, 4,000 soldiers were deployed in “troubled neighborhoods in Guatemala City.”
ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 178.
103
Budd, supra note 101. “This collaboration extended to joint urban patrolling, sometimes even using
tanks.” ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 178.
104
As Ralph Waldo Emerson opined, all history is subjective in the mind of each individual; but, by
placing facts in context, we can attempt to understand the development of the Nicaraguan security apparatus.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Collected Essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson, History, EASTON PRESS 5 (1962).
105
Preciado, supra note 10, at 44.
106
Id. at 45.
107
Rodgers, supra note 41, at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
108
Id.
109
Id. This shift mirrors the violence endemic in mara dominated Northern Triangle countries. Seelke,
supra note 26, at 6.
110
Rodgers, supra note 41, at 3. This dearth of available jobs pushed this younger generation into gangs
which lacked the soldiering background that pandillas drew from following the peace accords in 1990. Id. This
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pandillas were transforming, the Nicaraguan National Police was developing
responses geared towards the realities of this new status quo.
The Nicaraguan National Police traces its origins to the 1979 Fundamental
Statute of the Republic (FSLN), which created the first security institution
distinct from the Army following the Sandinista transition from the Somoza
dictatorship.111 Internal, as well as international political pressure following the
end of hostilities between the Sandinistas and the Contras, forced the National
Police to move beyond its origins in the Sandinista revolution.112 In order to
break with this tradition rooted in the Sandinista party structure, the Organic
Law of 1996 was implemented, which reformulated the institution and
“guaranteed a non-partisan nature.”113 Following this rebranding, the National
Police underwent a series of five-year plans, constantly reshaping and adapting
its structure.114
Throughout this continuous transformation, Nicaragua’s police force has
remained the least funded force in the Northern Triangle.115 Paradoxically, this
police force is, in the words of its director, “the smallest police force in Central
America, with the lowest salaries, but with the best results of any in the
region.”116 There are a number of metrics that support this assertion. For
example, the most recent numbers available place Nicaragua’s homicide rates at
eight per 100,000 inhabitants, the lowest such statistic in the region.117 Another
indicator, which can be related more directly to youth gangs, is the shocking

economic insecurity is often mentioned in the U.S. context, where, in response to drivers of gang affiliation, one
gang officer perceived that “[p]art of that, I’m sure, is socio-economic.” KATZ & WEBB, supra note 14, at 321.
111
Ramirez, supra note 1, at 32.
112
This is indicative of the underlying trend of constant reform. Id. at 34 (This pressure “to eliminate its
historic links to the FSLN” was the catalyst that spurred the definition of the force’s “institutional purpose.”).
113
Id. While the non-partisan nature of the police force is touted following the enactment of the 1996 law,
Director Granera was previously Chief of Staff for the Interior Ministry during the first Sandinista regime and
credits her decision to participate in the new force as one made after deciding “not [to] hand[] my rifle over to
someone who will use it against my people.” Id. Additionally, the strengthening of security institutions has been
attributed to the Sandinistas following the transition in order to “legitimate” their role post-1990. Cruz, supra
note 8, at 25.
114
Seelke, supra note 26, at 13; See POLICÍA NACIONAL, SISTEMATIZACIÓN DEL MODELO POLICIAL
COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO DE NICARAGUA, 38 (2011). [hereinafter MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO
PROACTIVO].
115
The Root Causes, supra note 94, at 47.
116
Tim Johnson, Nicaragua’s Top Cop, Who Once Wanted to Be a Nun, Fends Off Drug Gangs,
MCCLATCHEY HYDE DC (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article
24718984.html.
117
Reyes, supra note 3 (other indicators of security are also analyzed in this Comment).
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statistic that in a country of over six million inhabitants there are only seventy
juveniles in custody.118
Nicaraguan results represent a marked departure from those stemming from
mano dura techniques employed in Northern Triangle countries and in
analogous forms in the United States. The foregoing analysis will distinguish
unique features of Nicaragua’s juvenile justice program that relies on: (1)
political commitment to reform, (2) community involvement, (3) restorative
justice through education and rehabilitation, and (4) public legitimacy. The
Nicaraguan approach will be sharpened by the counterpoint provided by U.S.
and regional responses to gang problems. These best practices are exportable,
and U.S. policies should be tailored to these practices, resulting in a return to the
historical concept of community policing.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
While the United States may have developed modern community-oriented
policing strategies, Nicaragua created a version adapted to its own specific needs
that continues to be shaped by constant reform targeted at non-recurrence.119
This process is anything but stagnant and requires political commitment to
continuous reform.120 Confronted with the ambiguous and seemingly
paradoxical application of community-oriented policing models worldwide,
Nicaragua’s practices have the potential to inform a broader understanding of
community-oriented policing. The lessons learned from this period of transition
should not be confined to situations defined by transition but rather to any
community that would benefit from the implementation of similar programs
tailored to their specific situations on the ground. This application provides
timely knowledge that should inform practices in the United States where social
action groups have advanced the argument that “militarization of police
departments further erodes the trust that should exist between residents and the
police,” highlighting a disconnect between citizens and their police forces.121
118
Eyder Peralta, With a Soft Approach on Gangs, Nicaragua Eschews Violence, NPR (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/10/28/359612148/with-a-soft-approach-on-gangs-nicaraguaeschews-violence. Programs that may influence this number will be discussed in greater depth in the analysis of
Nicaragua’s programs, specifically those of their Juvenile Affairs division. Seelke, supra note 26, at 13. This
division “runs at least two anti-gang activities a month,” which focus on preventative and rehabilitative
techniques through involvement in “family, school and community interventions.” Id.
119
This continuous process can be seen through the implementation of successive five-year plans in an
effort to constantly improve best practices and adapt to realties of changing dynamics. Seelke, supra note 26, at
13; See also MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO supra note 114, at 38.
120
See generally Seelke, supra note 26, at 13 (describing successive five-year plans).
121
Tyler, supra note 81.
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The term “community policing” is inherently subjective, holding different
meanings for each jurisdiction shaped by local conditions and relationships.122
For the purposes of this Section, it will refer to its most basic concept—“policing
in partnership with the community.”123 While violence in Central America is
undoubtedly the product of many factors,124 the culture of Nicaragua’s National
Police and its engagement and partnership with the community, codified as a
result of political commitment to reform, is a distinct practice.125 In Nicaragua,
security gains targeted at addressing problems stemming from pandillas have
simultaneously precluded the importation of mara violence endemic in the
Northern Triangle.126
While programs like mano dura are overwhelmingly popular with their
corresponding populations, human rights abuses identified by the U.S. State
Department and violations of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC),127 compounded by a lack of reduction in rates of violence, point to a
need for an alternative approach.128 The United States is facing a similar problem
compounded by social perceptions that stem from a lack of trust between the
community and its officers.129 The militarization of police forces typified by
mano dura approaches has not provided answers to these dilemmas. Similarly,
the CRC only provides standards that signatories agree not to violate but does
not provide avenues through which to protect their populations while
simultaneously protecting the rights established by the convention.130 One
solution operating within the constraints of the convention can be illustrated by
the Nicaraguan approach through “inclusive and cooperative processes.”131
These processes can be understood in the context of their four key components:

122
For an overview of different uses of the term “community policing” within different State applications,
see RAO, supra note 13, at 1–6.
123
Id. at 1.
124
Cruz, supra note 8, at 25.
125
Crime in Latin America, supra note 12.
126
Stone, supra note 9.
127
ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 178–79 (describing the striking down of Salvadoran approaches
in contravention of the CRC).
128
In the years following the implementation of these approaches, there was actually a spike in violence,
leading to the theory that it was, in fact, State-sponsored violence, which begat more violence while also
obfuscating the State’s role in the violence itself. Cruz, supra note 8, at 25–26.
129
Tyler, supra note 81.
130
See generally National Juvenile Justice Network [NJJN], The Convention on the Rights of the Child:
Implications for Juvenile Justice Reform, Fact Sheet, at 2 (Mar. 2010).
131
Sarah Westerlund & Marlene Widenbladh, The Rural Judicial Facilitators Program in Nicaragua–an
Exemplary Model of Restorative Justice?, MFS-report No. 43, UMEÅ UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, p.
14. (Mar. 3, 2007).
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(1) political commitment to reform, (2) community involvement, (3) restorative
justice through education and rehabilitation, and (4) public legitimacy.
A. A Softer Approach
Rather than mano dura, Nicaraguan programs have taken a less combative
approach,132 which is reflected even in the branding of their programs. Names
include the “Bethlehem Plan” and the “Beach Plan.”133 Rather than
criminalizing behaviors that resulted in the mass incarceration of youth gang
members134 in contravention of the CRC,135 Nicaragua has taken a restorative
approach to juvenile justice.136 This is not a “soft form of justice” offering
impunity to the perpetrators of violence, but rather a constant reform of an
institution, guided by transitional justice mechanisms in the hopes of
perpetuating justice by preventing recurrences of violence.137 This approach is
characterized by community engagement informed by efforts targeted at nonrecurrence achieved through institutional reform.138 These measures are
promulgated by a clear and continuous political commitment to reform.139 These
reforms prioritize community involvement, providing for the implementation of
restorative justice programs that confer public legitimacy.140 This approach is
reflected in the development of the Nicaraguan National Police’s youth
programs. The National Police breaks its initiatives into four distinct time
periods: (1) 1970-1998, (2) the mid-1990s, (3) 1999-2003, and (4) post-2004.141
During the first period, the Nicaraguan assembly promulgated the “Ley
Tutelar de Menores” regulating the relationship between youth, their families,
132
The point has been made that these approaches might be “softer” in nature given the lesser level of
violence exhibited by pandillas. ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 179. But see Rodgers, supra note 41, at
6–7 (describing the nature of the pandillas as more representative of “youth gangsterism,” a distinction which
potentially makes lessons learned from pandilla engagement more widely applicable outside of the region).
133
ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 162.
134
For example, following the implementation of hard line approaches, El Salvador’s “incarcerated
population has doubled over the past five years.” Id. at 178; see also RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 7
(describing the crackdown following the Rodney King riots).
135
See ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 178–79.
136
See MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO, supra note 114, at 38 (understanding the program
as written).
137
This concept of transition in post-conflict settings comes about “as a result of generalized social conflict
in which, among other factors, there is a plethora of violent agents,” a situation that Nicaragua is proactively
combatting through preventative approaches in an attempt to promote non-recurrence. de Greiff, supra note 4,
¶ 19, 20.
138
See Ley No. 872, supra note 4.
139
See id.
140
See generally Crime in Latin America, supra note 12; see also Tyler, supra note 81.
141
See MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO, supra note 114, at 38–39.
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and the State.142 Within this context, the Department of Evaluation of Minors
was established, whose stated mission was to rehabilitate adolescents rather than
incarcerate them.143 In the second phase, the National Police placed the interest
of the child first, undertaking programs that involved the participation of
churches, local leaders, and family members, including them in the broader
dialogue.144 This type of community involvement is demonstrative of the
legitimacy conferred through meaningful partnership with the community.145
These programs have been criticized as political instruments used to strengthen
the current political leadership, necessitating the clarification of the line between
political support and control.146 A metric related to community involvement
divorced from this specter of political subterfuge is the public trust in police
leadership given the personal tension between President Ortega and Director
Granera.147 Director Granera sits atop the list of twenty-six Nicaraguan public
officials with an approval rating of eighty-seven percent.148
Social action groups in the United States have not conferred this level of
legitimacy on their police forces, as evinced by their position that the
“militarization of police departments further erodes the trust that should exist
between residents and the police.”149 Director Granera credits her department’s
multidisciplinary approach to policing for her success but emphasizes
community involvement, not militarization, as its greatest strength.150 One
department in which this community involvement is stressed is in the
Department of Juvenile Justice.151

142

Id. at 38.
Specifically, this program sought to rehabilitate adolescents who suffered from addictions and had runins with the law in order to “correct” behaviors rather than punish. See id.
144
See id.
145
This legitimacy can only be developed when it is the “fairness of police behavior–not the fear of police
force and the threat of punishment–[that] creates legitimacy and through it drives public actions.” Tyler, supra
note 81, at 2.
146
Peralta, supra note 118.
147
Stone, supra note 9 (describing political promotions, the current Director’s Sandinista ties, and
WikiLeaks cables demonstrating political intrigue).
148
Johnson, supra note 116.
149
Turning Back the Tide: Promising Efforts to Demilitarize Police Departments, POL’Y LINK
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Apr. 2015) https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55b673c0e4b0cf84699bdffb/t/
55b85c4fe4b044c6d34683d8/1438145615746/PL_BCC_DEMIL_POLICE_DEPT_04292015_rev.pdf.
150
Stone, supra note 9 (summarizing her model as one that is “preventative, proactive, communitarian,
deeply rooted in the heart of the community”); see also Crime in Latin America, supra note 12 (pointing out the
unique feature of the recruitment process, which requires community approval for each academy recruit,
potentially serving as a driver for community engagement and buy-in).
151
See MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO supra note 114, at 39.
143
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Through this community partnership, the National Police realized the value
in continuing to shift its focus from reactive measures to preventative measures
and educational outreach.152 Building on the second phase, which emphasizes
youth involvement, phase three saw the modernization of the police force and
the creation of the Juvenile Affairs Division, which focuses on the dynamics of
violence aimed at understanding risk factors that would identify youths prone to
violence and gang affiliation in order to rehabilitate them.153 The fourth phase
culminated in 2004 with the introduction of the Drug Abuse Resistance
Education Program (DARE) program as well as Nicaragua’s signature “No
Violence Program.”154
The preventative approach that was in place post-2004 utilizes a three-level
continuum to rank youths according to risk levels before tailoring outreach
programs to specific needs.155 Level 1 includes all youths who are given
information that pertains to education and social interactions through outreach
programs, like DARE.156 Level 2 includes juveniles struggling with drugs or
violent behavior.157 Diagnostics and psychological help are sought for this
group, with the hope that, along with familial support, problems can be
addressed, allowing for the integration of the child as a contributing member of
the community.158 Level 3 involves juveniles identified as participating in gang
activity or having other criminal histories, which puts them in the highest risk
category.159
In response to this highest risk category, the Juvenile Affairs Division
developed a holistic process informed by the Nicaraguan National Assembly’s
promulgation of El Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, whose stated purpose
is to put the interests of the adolescent first.160 In this endeavor, “community” is
a term that pervades every step of the process.161 Through partnerships with the
community, neighborhoods are reviewed in coordination with local
stakeholders, and individuals are identified who fall into this highest risk

152

See id. at 38.
See id.
154
See id.
155
See id. at 40.
156
See id.
157
See id.
158
See id.
159
See id.
160
See id. This goal is also in keeping with the UN in Rights of the Child Convention. National Juvenile
Justice Network [NJJN], supra note 130, at 2.
161
See generally MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO, supra note 114, at 39.
153
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category.162 Once at-risk youth have been identified, they are not arrested; rather,
their familial and community relationships are evaluated to produce a
psychosocial assessment.163 This decision to first pursue rehabilitation in
partnership with the community not only reinforces public perception of
“fairness of police behavior” as opposed to “the fear of police force and the
threat of punishment,” but also results in “legitimacy and through it drives public
actions.”164 Integrative methods are then sought to involve the youth in
community events while stressing the importance of social relationships.165
Following this introductory vetting phase, the youth is offered a place at the
national trade school in return for a pledge before his or her community to
commit to non-violence.166 Upon graduation from this seven-track technical
program, partner corporations employ the former gang members.167 This reintegration into the community demonstrates a full cycle of a Juvenile Justice
initiative, which is credited in large part for Nicaragua’s low violence statistics
and the incarceration of a mere seventy youths in the entire country.168 While
these numbers are impressive, criticism has ascribed success to manifold factors.
Critics of the Nicaraguan system have posited that the decline in gang
violence is “short term” and the efforts of government organizations and NGOs
suffer from a lack of funding.169 This is a difficult concept to square with
legislation codifying these principles in Nicaraguan law170 and the long-term
statistics supporting the efficacy of the Nicaraguan model in spite of a lack of
funding.171 This criticism would be better directed at other Latin American
countries that all have chronically underfunded “crime prevention” bodies (as
are their rehabilitation programs) but have not experienced the same drops in
violence that Nicaragua has been able to achieve on a national level.172 While
funding plays a role, political capital outside of Nicaragua has been spent on
militarization rather than community-centered reforms.173

162

See id.
See id. at 40.
164
Tyler, supra note 81.
165
See MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO, supra note 114, at 40–41.
166
See id. at 41 (understanding the program as written).
167
See id.
168
Peralta, supra note 118.
169
Richard Maclure & Melvin Sotelo, Youth Social Capital Formation in Nicaragua, 22 INT’L J.
CHILDREN’S RTS. 385, 404 (2014).
170
See generally Ley No. 872, supra note 4.
171
Seelke, supra note 26, at 13.
172
Id. at 13.
173
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Other criticisms have ascribed Nicaragua’s enviable statistics not to any
particularly successful program, but simply to institutional factors that
distinguish it from its neighbors.174 Specifically, critics argue Nicaragua’s
institutionalization of its National Police force was not hobbled by “elements of
the old regime” and was able to evade “public accountability” resulting from
“political agreements” in the Northern Triangle.175 Holdovers from prior
regimes were able to exploit state institutions maintaining holds on the levers of
power, perpetuating extralegal violence.176 This is a tenuous claim given the
“highly-charged atmosphere of Nicaraguan politics.”177 The institutionalization
and professionalization of the police force are the very reasons Nicaragua’s
model should be exported to the United States. Further, the police force—
especially its leadership structure—has a degree of stability not present in the
Northern Triangle, but which is endemic in the professionalized U.S. system.178
There is, however, one glaring impediment to this analogy.
The most difficult concept to square with democratic governance is a vestige
of what can only be described as a Stasi-esque state security model. The
Nicaraguan government has promulgated “Citizen Security” legislation that
codifies the goals of the police force while empowering citizens.179 To this end,
Social Prevention of Crime Committees have been formed along with Cabinets
of Citizen Power, which “provide a direct link with the community.”180 While
these types of programs have been criticized as having been “crafted as political
tools,”181 the underlying concept is nonetheless laudable and further
demonstrates a political commitment to reform. It would be naïve not to express
concern, given the structure of the cabinets and the presidential link to the
cabinet and the police force.182 However, the past three years have assuaged
these fears, and the takeaway has shifted from the structure of the system to the
intent behind it. This intent should be understood as involving the population in
its own security system by integrating its engagement with the police force.
While Nicaragua may not be able to export its neighborhood watch, political
reform conducive to the underlying trust between the community and police
174
José Miguel Cruz, Democratization Under Assault: Criminal Violence in Post-Transition Central
America 173 (2010) [hereinafter “Democratization Under Assault”].
175
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force presents an exportable community policing model aimed at combatting
youth gang violence. It is political commitment to community involvement in
restorative justice programs that promotes the public legitimacy that Nicaragua’s
neighbors and the United States desperately need.
While their neighbors have “pared down to little more than monthly
meetings,”183 Nicaragua has focused its police force on “targeting the social
conditions that cause” crime and developed “conditions which reduce it.”184
Nicaragua and its neighbors are populated by an overwhelming percentage of
citizens who recognize crime as a threat to their “[n]ation’s well-being.”185
Rather than addressing fear through community policing, Northern Triangle
countries implemented problem-oriented approaches that relied on military
coordination.186 These approaches mirror the gang-unit approach undertaken by
many U.S. jurisdictions, where the most commonly used measures are described
by agencies as targeted patrols and specialized “gang units.”187 These techniques
typically focus on suppression tactics, which were once the most prevalent tactic
in the United States but were “frequently viewed as the least effective.”188 This
method has remained popular not because of its effectiveness in local
jurisdictions, but rather as a result of “mimetic processes” targeted at creating
“institutional legitimacy,” rather than tailoring programs to “environmental
contingencies.”189
One of the most copied programs was that of the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD), whose Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums
(CRASH) unit “became a national model.”190 While “community” figures
prominently in the CRASH acronym, its operations were characterized by
“decisively and aggressively” executed operations that, in a single year, yielded
183
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upwards of 25,000 arrests for “the slightest infractions.”191 This mindset won
national acclaim, yet a mere ten years later CRASH had been disbanded as
scandals devastated community trust, making excessive force and extrajudicial
enforcement become standard operating procedure.192 Short-term crime
reductions were achieved through brutal tactics, whose unsustainable practices
not only eroded public trust but also failed to achieve long-term reductions in
youth gang violence.193 This is where Nicaragua’s experience is most useful
when distinguished from its neighbors, where mimetic processes modeled after
these hard-line U.S. techniques failed.194 Rather than short-term gains achieved
through aggressive and abrasive tactics, Nicaragua focused on long-term
outcomes through policing in partnership with the community.195 Further, when
neighboring countries have engaged in piecemeal community policing, trials in
smaller cities in Guatemala and El Salvador have been successful.196 Assuming
adequate political support, this success has come despite their limited scope and
funding, indicating the portability of some form of community model.197
While the name or classification of the gang, along with percentages of
violence attributable to gangs, may vary from country to country, governments
should target the underlying fear through legislation fostering community
policing. Problem-oriented policing addresses disorder resulting from crime, not
fear.198 In the United States, this was best characterized in a survey of gang units
that found that “underlying” issues were not in the officer’s purview, as the gang
units saw their role as purely “reactive in nature—that they were to respond to
real problems after they occurred.”199 Here, the emphasis on community
involvement was simply gathering intelligence that would lead to the resolution
of backward-looking investigations.200 Intelligence is a laudable and necessary
first step, but simply applying it to backward-looking investigations not only
fails to address the root cause of the violence but also limits its value. For
191
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example, this limited value is seen in the feedback loop described by an
Albuquerque police commander who described his gang unit’s community
involvement as it related to intelligence gathering: “We know who they are and
what they do, and we communicate with them. But we’re not going to change
them . . . they basically say that they are a bad guy and you have got to catch
me.”201 This department identified gang members and engaged with them, but
the dialogue could only end in arrest and incarceration. Alternatively, the
Nicaraguan approach envisions an outcome where the gang members can be
reintegrated into their community as productive members of society.202
This same underdeveloped community policing dynamic is seen in Dallas.
The Dallas Police Department received a grant in 1996 to implement
“Interactive Community Policing.”203 This initiative manifested itself in three
main suppression tactics: “aggressive truancy enforcement,” “high visibility
patrols,” and “stopping and frisking suspected gang members or other suspicious
persons.”204 This approach does not engage the community in the vein of
Nicaraguan partnership but demonstrates the varied application of the
community concept.205 Given this wide gap between the U.S. and Nicaraguan
models, a return to a conventional standard embodied by Nicaragua’s concept
of “policing in partnership with the community,” codified through political
commitment, presents a path to restorative rather than retributive justice.206
Like most theories, the abstract appears straightforward, but the reality is
more convoluted. The Nicaraguan methodology should not be duplicated.
Instead, the intent behind the development of their practices should be
considered in the implementation of community-oriented policing practices.
Political commitment to reform aimed at codifying a community-focused
approach has granted legitimacy in the eyes of the Nicaraguan population while
effectively stifling youth gang violence.207 In the United States, officers have
identified that “[t]he neighborhoods kind of need to protect themselves. I think
that has given rise to some of the gang activity.”208 Given this sentiment, why
not partner and provide an alternative collective security strategy?209 Policing in
partnership has become a catchphrase worldwide, but in Nicaragua it has
201
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become more than just a lofty ideal. It has been codified in legislation aimed at
policing in partnership with the community.210 Reflecting on this development
through the lens of transitional justice, the Director of Juvenile Affairs opined,
“[t]he repression that we had during the 70s, taught us a lesson,” specifically
“that when there is repression, there is a reaction.”211
CONCLUSION
In our globalizing world, transnational as well as inter-state gang problems
will continue to proliferate. However, by focusing on local efforts and sharing
best practices, agencies can learn from their peers and gain legitimacy through
partnership with the community. No matter the number of arrests, the reality
remains that this is not a zero-sum game. Conditions exist which give rise to
these gangs, and only through proactive community engagement can they be
addressed. No gang problem is the same and responses must be tailored to the
individual communities.
A first step has been taken in the United States where gang units gather
information on gang activities.212 The information has been deployed in
backward-looking investigations and gang harassment affected through
suppression strategies.213 Building on these information-gathering techniques,
the information gathered could be deployed in the vein of the holistic Nicaraguan
approach, which engages youth gang members.214 Whether transnational, local,
or inter-state, any juxtaposition of the aforementioned local engagement should
begin at the community level. Local engagement with the community will not
only enable more efficient intelligence gathering but will also create a
relationship where the “fairness of police behavior—not the fear of police force
and the threat of punishment—creates legitimacy and through it drives public
actions.”215 This linkage enables police departments and local communities to
address underlying causes of youth gang membership that are specific to their
individual communities while realizing simultaneous gains in public perception
through transparency, combatting the corrosion of “trust that should exist
between residents and the police.”216
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Reform does not always guarantee success. Indeed, there have been a
number of failed efforts to implement community policing practices aimed at
addressing gang violence.217 Nicaragua does not represent a silver bullet
guaranteeing success in addressing youth gang violence, but its holistic approach
enabled by political commitment to reform demonstrates the practice of
theoretical precepts advanced in the United States.218 Building on these concepts
of “community embeddedness, formal problem solving, and geographic
accountability,” gang units will be both more effective and more legitimate.219
Community policing should not refer to an abstract concept but should facilitate
these models in practice through continuous community engagement, as
demonstrated by Nicaraguan policies. While each iteration of community
policing will be different, through continuous reform, undergirded by political
commitment to reform, community partnership will combat drivers of youth
gang violence. This co-production of security will result in communities in
which local, transnational, or any hybrid thereof will be unable to find roots.
While there may be a consensus at a “fundamental level” as to the nature of
community policing, there are “factors contributing to the divergence of
definition” which should attempt to channel Nicaragua’s approach, stressing: (1)
political commitment to reform, (2) community involvement, (3) restorative
justice through education and rehabilitation, and (4) public legitimacy.220
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